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THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE REMEDY AVAILABLE
TO THE VICTIM OF A MISUSE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS:
THE TORT OF ABUSE OF PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The legal process is subject to, various forms of misuse. A cause of
action may be commenced falsely and with a malicious intention to injure
the defendant. Alternatively, a specific writ arising out of the litigation
may be used in an attempt to coerce an illicit result. The possibilities are
too numerous to list.
In the context of a misused legal process, it does not suffice to rely
upon the ability of the victim to successfully defend the malicious claim.
Substantial damage may occur irrespective of the ultimate disposition
of the litigation or writ. This damage remains uncompensated unless the
victim is able to affirmatively assert his claim in a cause of action
based upon the misuse.
This note analyzes the victim's remedy in a limited factual context-
situations in which the illicit activity occurs after the litigation has
commenced. Abuse of process, the sole tort directed at activities within
this factual context, is clarified and its elements are defined. This
clarification process reveals situations in which abuse of process does
not apply and the victim is remediless.
ABUSE OF PROCESS: GENERALLY
The tort of abuse of process is one of a number of torts designed to
provide, a remedy for a person who has been injured by an improper
use of litigation. Specifically, abuse of process affords relief in those
situations in which a valid legal process is properly set in motion and
then misused.'
Abuse of process is one of the most obscure torts in the law. One
reason for this obscurity is the failure of the courts to restrict their use of
the term to a definable catagory of situations.
The term has been used for a variety of dissimilar situations
which have in common only the fact that actionable injury was
inflicted in connection with the use of judicial process and
under circumstances such that the narrowly circumscribed ac-
tion of malicious prosecution was inapplicable.2
1. Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
2. Italina Star Line v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
53 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931).
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This blanket use of the term "abuse of process" has resulted in con-
fusion as to the elements of the tort.
ABUSE OF PROCESS AND RELATED TORTS
A. Introduction
The differences between abuse of process and other torts ascribed
to the improper use of litigation must be noted if the elements of abuse
of process are to be clarified. The courts have named four torts involving
the misuse of litigation. These are: malicious abuse of process, ' malicious
use of process,' malicious prosecution,' and abuse of process.'
Certain jurisdictions distinguish malicious use of process and malici-
ous prosecution.7 Both torts deal with essentially the same wrongful
act.' However, in jurisdictions recognizing a distinction, malicious pro-
secution is limited to misuses of criminal actions while malicious use of
process is restricted to civil actions.9 Malicious abuse of process and
abuse of process are identical torts, the difference being in name only.'
B. Malicious prosecution and abuse of process compared.
1. Origin of the litigation.
As indicated in the preliminary discussion, an abuse of process
occurs when a person misuses a legal process after the litigation has
commenced." On the other hand, a cause of action for malicious prosecu-
tion is based upon the malicious initiation of litigation. 12
The two torts may be differentiated on the basis of the point at
which the wrongful action of the tortfeasor occurs. For example, mali-
cious prosecution might occur where A sues B for breach of contract,
3. Coplea v. Bybee, 290 Ill. App. 613, 8 N.E.2d 55 (1937).
4. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Walker, 45 Ga. App. 395, 165 S.E. 160 (1932).
5. Hicks v. Brantly, 102 Ga. 264, 29 S.E. 459 (1897).
6. Lakutis v. Greenwood, 9 N.J. 101, 87 A.2d 23 (1952).
7. See Georgia Loan & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 116 Ga. 628, 43 S.E. 27 (1902)
Aalfs v. Aalfs, 246 Ia. 158, 66 N.W.2d 121 (1954).
8. In both "malicious prosecution" and "malicious use of process" the plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the defendant caused a process to issue; (2) the action terminated
in favor of the plaintiff; (3) defendant instituted the action without probable cause and
with malice; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damage. See, e.g., Grove v. Purity Stores
Ltd., 153 Cal. App. 2d 234, 314 P.2d 543 (1957) ; Carbaugh v. Peat, 40 Il. App. 2d 37,
189 N.W.2d 14 (1963); Dwyer v. McClean, 133 Ind. App. 454, 175 N.E.2d 50 (1961).
9. See Guth v. Walker, 92 Ga. App. 490, 88 S.E.2d 821 (1955) ; Nix v. Goodhill,
95 Ia. 282, 63 N.W. 701 (1895).
10. Coplea v. Bybee, 290 Ill. App. 613, 8 N.E.2d 55 (1937).
11. Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
12. Cf. Lambert v. Breton, 127 Me. 510, 144 A. 864 (1929) ; Walker v. American
Security Trust Co., 237 Md. 80, 205 A.2d 302 (1964) ; Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54,
194 A. 174 (1937) ; Ellis v. Wallons, 224 N.C. 269, 29 S.E.2d 884 (1944) ; Jobbers
Fin. Corp. v. Lane, 221 N.C. 189, 19 S.E.2d 849 (1942).
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knowing that there was no breach. On the other hand, abuse of process
might occur where, during the course of the breach of contract proceed-
ings, A has B arrested and put in jail, intending to coerce a larger settle-
ment from B.
2. Probable cause requirement.
To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the injured
party must prove that the original action has terminated. He must also
show that the original action was instituted without probable chance of
success."3 Neither of these factors is necessary in order to state a
cause of action for abuse of process."4
3. Requirement of a valid process.
Facts which support an action for malicious prosecution may also
support a cause of action for abuse of process.15 This is true even though
malicious prosecution is based upon false allegations while abuse of
process is based upon a regularly issued process."6
This apparent contradiction dissolves when the connotation of "re-
gularly issued" is understood. The court in Hoppe v. Klapperich
explained the usage of the phrase in the following terms:
The courts commonly refer to the abuse of process as being the
perversion of a regularly issued process, but it seems that such
language is used for the mere purpose of calling attention to
the fact that the action commonly lies notwithstanding the
process may have been regularly issued.'8
Accordingly, abuse of process may lie where a process is issued
upon false allegations and the proceedings are wrongful 9 throughout."0
13. See note 8 supra.
14. Granger v. Hill, 4 Bing. (N.C.) 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838).
15 Hall v. Field Enterprises, 194 A.2d 479 (D.C. Mun. App. 1953) ; Ash v.
Cohn, 119 N.J. L. 54, 194 A. 174 (1937).
16. Rock v. Abrashin, 154 Wash. 51, 280 P. 740, 741 (1929) (emphasis added);
see also Melton v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 36 S.E.2d 276 (1945). It was stated in
Wood v. Groves, 144 Mass. 365, 11 N.E. 567 (1887) that "it is to be assumed in such
a case that the process was lawfully issued for a just cause and is valid in form and
that the arrest or other proceedings upon the process was justifiable and proper in its
inception." Accord, Whitten v. Bennett, 86 F. 405 (2d Cir. 1898).
17. 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
18. Id. at 786. In this case A sued B for allegedly stealing a watch. B charged
abuse of process alleging A knew the charges were false and the real reason the action
was instituted was to extort certain property from B. A contended there was no basis
for an action for abuse of process unless the process was lawfully and properly
issued. This contention was held to be in error.
19. See McHann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 134 A. 810 (1926) ; Branty v. Rhodes-
Havery Furnace Co., 131 Ga. 276, 62 S.E. 222 (1908).
20. Some courts have used the term "abuse of legal process" instead of "abuse of
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One fact situation could support an action for abuse of process and an
action for malicious prosecution-if the process were wrongfully issued
and subsequently perverted. For example, if A caused B to be arrested
and jailed for a debt, knowing that B owed no such debt, B would have an
action for malicious prosecution.2' Further, if as a condition for B's
release, A extorted certain property from B, B would also have an action
for abuse of process."
ABUSE OF PROCESS: THE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT
The nineteenth century English case of Granger v. Hill" was the
first instance in which relief was granted for an abuse of process. In
Granger the plaintiff borrowed money from the defendant, giving him
a mortgage on plaintiff's vessel as security. The plaintiff retained the
registration of the vessel in his: own name. Defendant attempted to
collect the debt ten months before maturity. When the plaintiff was un-
able to pay, the defendant caused him to be arrested and jailed. As a
condition for his release from prison, the plaintiff was forced to give
up the registration of the vessel.
In holding for the plaintiff and establishing abuse of process as
a separate tort, the court said:
This case is altogether distinct from cases of malicious, prose-
cution or arrest in which it is always necessary to allege and
prove the former proceeding is at an end. It is an action for
abusing the process of law, by employing it to extort property to
which the defendants had no right. That is of itself a sufficient
cause of action without alleging that there was no reasonable
or probable cause for the suit itself.24
Since Granger, abuse of process has been variously defined.2 5
However, certain generalizations may be made for the purposes of an-
alysis. In order to recover for abuse! of process, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) defendant's misuse of a valid process, properly issued by the court in
process" which might suggest that the former could not apply to facts giving rise to a
cause of action for malicious prosecution while the latter could. See Lobel v. Trade
Bank, 132 Misc. 643, 229 N.Y.S. 778 (New York City Ct. 1921). However, the
two terms have been used interchangeably without any attempt to make a distinction. See
Morpy v. Shiply, 351 Pa. 425, 41 A.2d 671 (1945).
21. Cf. Carbaugh v. Peat, 40 Ill. App. 2d 37, 189 N.E.2d 14 (1963).
22. Cf. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
23. 4 Bing. (N.C.) 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838).
24. Id. at 774.
25. See McCartney v. Appalachian Hall, 230 N.C. 60, 51 S.E.2d 886 (1949)
Lakutis v. Greenwood, 9 N.J. 101, 87 A.2d 23, 25 (1952); Farmer's Gin Co. v. Ward,
73 N.M. 405, 389 P.2d 9, 11 (1964) ; Melton v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 36 S.E.2d
276 (1945).
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the course of a legal proceeding; (2) defendant's ulterior motive in
misusing the process; and (3) damage to the plaintiff as a result of
defendant's conduct.
26
A. Issuance of a "valid process."
Abuse of process is defined as a misuse of a validly issued process.
It is, therefore, important to understand the impact of the term, "valid
process."
In the broadest sense, "process" refers to procedure.2 ' Liberally
construed, this term embraces all of the proceedings connected with the
litigation of a cause of action.28 In its narrowest sense, "process" refers
to individual writs issued by the court during or after the litigation.26
Although there is authority to the contrary,"° it is in this narrow
sense that the term "process" is used in a discussion of abuse of process."
Typically, an action for abuse of process is limited to situations involving
the misuse of a specific writ. Accordingly, an abuse of process is com-
monly found in situations where the writs of garnishment,12 attachment 8
or execution 4 are misused.
The broad construction of the term "process" is illustrated by the
case of Spellens v. Spellens 5 In Spellens, a wife brought an action
seeking separate maintenance. Subsequently, the husband initiated a
separate action to recover possession of certain personal property. The
husband offered to discontinue his action if the wife would reciprocate.
The wife cross-complained for abuse of process, alleging that the true
purpose of her husband's action was to coerce her discontinuance of the
original action. In sustaining the wife's claim for abuse of process,
the court stated:
26. E.g., Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 165 So. 394 (1936).
27. E.g., "Process" is the means through which a court compels appearance of a
party. Crown Laundry v. Roberton, 205 Ga. 214, 53 S.E.2d 116 (1949); McKenna v.
Cooper, 79 Kan. 847, 101 P. 662 (1904). "Process" is any means of acquiring juris-
diction. Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953). The term "process"
includes all writs. Phillips v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 44 (D. Del. 1949).
28. See Cutler v. Cutler, 28 Misc. 2d 526, 217 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
Mobley v. Jackson, 40 Ga. App. 761, 151 S.E. 522, 524 (1930).
29. Sterns v. State, 23 Okla. 462, 100 P. 909, 914 (1909).
30. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. App. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
31. Blackstock v. Tatum, 396 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
32. Williams v. City Stores Co., 192 A.2d 534 (D.C. Mun. App. 1963) (garnish-
ment of wages for a debt known not to be owed).
33. Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913) (attachment sued
out to prevent the transfer of the property attached and not to secure the debt).
34. Little v. Sowers, 167 Kan. 72, 204 P.2d 605 (1949) (procuring wrongful
execution on a void judgment).
35. 49 Cal. App. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
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The improper purpose of a [misuse of a process] usually takes
the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not prop-
erly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of
property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as
a threat or a club. There is in other words a form of extor-
tion."6
In failing to require the misuse of a specific writ, the Spellens court
recognized the existence of the tort of abuse of process in situations
involving a wrongful use of an entire law suit.
Abuse of process, however, is generally not accorded the broad
scope of application indicated by the Spellens court. The typical position
was succinctly stated in Blackstock v. Tatum :
Abuse of process consists not in the filing and maintenance of
a civil action, but rather in the perversion of some process is-
sued in the suit after its issuance. The process referred to in
the cases is not the filing and maintenance of a civil action but
in the wrongful use of a writ issued in the suit.8
B. Illegal and perverted use of the process.
The "gist" of an action for abuse of process is the wrongful use of
the process to effectuate an objective which is an improper function
of the particular process.3 9
A wrongful use is found under a variety of circumstances. Illustrative
of these is the situation involving an excessive attachment. Although ex-
cessive attachment may form the basis for a cause of action for abuse of
process,4" the line beyond which the attachment becomes excessive is
unclear. In Quaranto v. Silverman4 1 the attachment of property worth
$800 to secure an obligation of $356.30 was not excessive and did not
constitute an abuse of process.
An attachment for an amount greater than the debt owed is allowed
to provide for the possibility that interest and taxable costs might raise
36. 317 P.2d at 626 (court's emphasis).
37. 396 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
38. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
39. Cf. Braswell v. Mason Kommers Tire Co., 56 Ga. App. 593, 193 S.E. 377
(1937); Berhrandt v. Rassmussen, 234 Minn. 128, 24 N.W.2d 779 (1951); Cardy v.
Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Morman v. Baran, 35
N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Geier v. Jordan, 107 A.2d 440 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954).
40. Saliem v. Glovskey, 132 Me. 402, 172 A. 4 (1934) (property valued from
$1,000 to $1,200 was attached under a command to attach a value of $70). Excessive
attachment will also support the common law tort of "wrongful attachment." Spaids
v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289 (1870).
41. 345 Mass. 423, 187 N.E.2d 859 (1962).
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the amount owed." If the interest and costs do not justify the excess,
the defendant may move for a reduction of the amount attached, thereby
reducing the future hardship.4 Abuse of process would then provide
a remedy for the damages that were incurred prior to, or were unavoid-
able by the reduction.
In addition to excessive attachments, wrongful use is found where
the defendant has levied on and sold property that was not subject to
levy and sale. 4 Further examples of a wrongful use are the procuring
of the arrest of the plaintiff in order to compel him to abandon a claim of
right" and the attachment of property in an attempt to enforce a
claim that is known to be groundless."
C. Proof of malice.
The extent to which the wrongful use of the process must be
actuated by malice is unclear. Proof of malice is essential to state a cause
of action for abuse of process." However, the requirement of malice is
satisfied if the plaintiff proves that the process was intentionally or will-
fully misused.' The intent to. misuse a process provides a basis from
which malice is inferred.4" On the other hand, malice cannot be inferred
from a mere mistake."0 Apparently then, the requirement of malice
merely limits abuse of process to the realm of intentional torts."'
D. Ulterior motive.
In addition to proving wrongful and malicious use, the plaintiff
42. Swartz v. Brockton Say. Bank, 318 Mass. 66, 60 N.E.2d 362 (1945) (attach-
ment of $110 for a claim of $26).
43. Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 187 N.E.2d 859 (1962).
44. Coplea v. Bybee, 290 Ill. App. 613, 8 N.E.2d 55 (1937).
45. White v. Apsley Rubber Co., 181 Mass. 339, 63 N.E. 885 (1902) ; See also
Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.E.2d 491 (Ky. 1966) (arrest of a credit manager who had
instituted garnishment proceedings to coerce a dismissal of the garnishment).
46. Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345, 159 N.E. 751 (1938).
47. See, e.g., Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913); Keller v.
Butler, 246 N.Y. 249, 158 N.E. 510 (1927) ; Robert & St. John Motor Co. v. Bumpass,
65 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
48. The court in Coplea v. Bybee, 290 Ill. App. 117, 8 N.E.2d 55 (1937), stated:
The term "malice" in this connection is not to be given its ordinary meaning,
but is to be extended so as to include willfulness. Actual malice is unimportant
if the process is willfully used to accomplish the purpose intended since un-
lawful acts willfully done are to be deemed malicious as to those injured
thereby.
8 N.E.2d at 59. See Marlatte v. Weickgenant, 147 Mich. 266, 110 N.W. 1061 (1907)
Dean v. Kockendorfer, 237 N.Y. 384, 143 N.E. 229 (1924) ; Pittsburg, J. E. & E. Ry. Co.
v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 143 N.C. 54, 55 S.E. 422 (1906).
49. Petry v. Childs & Co., 43 Misc. 108, 88 N.Y.S. 286 (1904).
50. Clikes v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 165 So. 394 (1936) (plaintiff's property
wrongfully attached through a mistake).
51. Id.
et al.: Attorney's Negligence: The Belated Appeal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1967
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
must show that the misuse of the process was the result of an ulterior or
concealed motive." Restated, the ulterior motive test is whether the
process was used to accomplish a collateral objective that is beyond the
normal purview of the process" This may be established directly or by
inference.54
1. Direct proof of motive.
The ulterior motive was established directly in Coplea v. Bybee."5
Here the plaintiff proved that the defendant levied on and sold property
which was not properly subject to levy and sale. The plaintiff further
proved that the defendant's purpose in obtaining the illegal levy and sale
was to affect the sale of the property rather than to fulfill the claim that
he had against the plaintiff. This illicit purpose constituted the de-
fendant's ulterior motive.
In Lader v. Benkowit-,5 6 the plaintiff proved that the misuse of
a warrant of arrest was intended to coerce payment of an unfounded
claim. Here again, proof of the purpose for which the process was
misused directly established the collateral purpose of the defendant.
2. Inferential proof of motive.
When the ulterior motive is shown by inference, the basis of the in-
ference is the wrongful use of the process." The plaintiff in Hall v.
Hollywood Credit Clothing Co.5" utilized such an inference. Here, the
defendant caused an attachment to be issued under a judgment against
the plaintiff. The plaintiff had the attachment quashed following a show-
ing that the claim was unfounded.59 Knowing that the claim was un-
52. Pinental v. Hauk, 101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 226 P.2d 739 (1951); Hoppe v.
Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947) ; Earl v. Winne, 34 N.J. Super. 605,
112 A.2d 791 (1955); Ellis v. Wellons, 224 N.C. 269, 29 S.E.2d 884 (1944) ; and
see cases cited in note 45 supra.
53. Jeffry v. Robbins, 73 Ill. App. 353 (1897); Lambert v. Brenton, 127 Me.
510, 144 A. 464 (1929).
54. 290 Ill. App. 117, 8 N.E.2d 55 (1937).
55. 188 Misc. 156, 66 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
56. Glidewill v. Murry-Lacy & Co., 124 Va. 563, 98 S.E. 665 (1919).
57. 147 A.2d 866 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958).
58. The court stated this attachment did not constitute an abuse of process since
the proceedings were used for the legally intended purpose-satisfying the judgment.
147 A.2d at 868.
59. The court stated:
The issuance of the second attachment upon a judgment at a time when there
was no judgment outstanding was an abuse of process, because appellee thereby
forced appellant to do something which it could not otherwise legally and
regularly compel her to do, that and at a time when appellee had no right to it.
Further the existence of an ulterior motive may be inferred from this action
which appellee is alleged to have done with full knowledge of the situation.
147 A.2d at 868.
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founded, the defendant obtained a garnishment of the plaintiff's salary.
The plaintiff, claiming that this use of the writ of garnishment was
wrongful, instituted an action for abuse of process. No proof was made
of the ulterior purpose for which the writ was misused. However, the
court held that the wrongful use of the writ gave rise to an inference of
an ulterior motive. The collateral objective in this case was the collection
of the groundless claim.6
3. No proof of motive.
Doubt is cast upon the need to prove an ulterior motive by some
courts who fail to require such proof. A typical case is Williams v.
City Stores."' The court did not mention the requirement of an ulterior
motive. It found an abuse of process in the garnishment of the plaintiff's
wages where the defendant knew that he had wrongfully taken a de-
fault judgment. No proof was made of any motive other than the
collection of the judgment.
Whereas the Williams court ignored the ulterior motive require-
ment, other courts have specifically denied its necessity. Illustrative of
this reaction is the statement of the court in Varga v. Pareless: 2
"[W]hile an ulterior motive is often present, it is not an essential ele-
ment to the action."
The appellate court of Illinois reached the opposite conclusion
upon facts similar to the facts in Williams. In March v. Caciappo,63
the defendant, knowing that his claim was groundless, garnisheed the
plaintiff's bank account. The court stated that the institution of garnish-
ment proceedings is a normal procedure in the collection of a debt. 4
Without an allegation of an ulterior motive, the complaint for abuse
of process failed. 5
60. The court in Carpenter Baggot & Co. v. Hanes, 167 N.C. 551, 83 S.E. 577
(1914), stated in a dictum that the doubt expressed as to the necessity for the coexistence
of both elements of abuse of process may be removed if the unlawful and wrongful use
of the process is always regarded as implying the illegal and ulterior purpose if
that be essential to create an actionable wrong.
61. 192 A.2d 534 (D.C. Mun. App. 1963).
62. 137 Conn. 663, 81 A.2d 112 (1951).
63. 37 Ill. App. 2d 235, 185 N.E.2d 397 (1962).
64. The court sustained that portion of the plaintiff's complaint for malicious
prosecution.
65. E.g., Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1957); Sachs v.
Levy, 216 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ; Seibrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 185 F. Supp.
538 (D. Ore. 1960) ; Merz v. Merz White Way Tours, 166 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1958)
Tapely v. Younmants, 95 Ga. App. 161, 97 S.E2d 365 (1957); Bonney v. King, 201
Ill. 27, 66 N.E. 377 (1903); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780
(1947) ; Earl v. Winne, 34 N.J. Super. 605, 112 A.2d 791 (1955) ; Lichter v. Interwoven
Stocking Co., 234 App. Div. 204, 254 N.Y.S. 375 (1934); Garland v. Wilson, 289 Pa.
272, 137 A. 266 (1927).
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E. Proof of damages.
An action for abuse of process cannot be sustained unless there is
an allegation and proof of damages.6" Abuse of process generally re-
quires proof of special damages.67 Typically, these special damages must
include an actual arrest or a seizure of the plaintiff's property.6"
The rationale for requiring an arrest or seizure is unclear. Apparent-
ly, this requirement is applied to abuse of process through an analogy to
malicious prosecution. 9 In the context of malicious prosecution, an
arrest or seizure is required in an attempt to avoid the possibility of an
action being brought by every successful defendant.7" If the defendant's
remedy were not so limited, it is argued, an honest suitor would be de-
terred from bringing an action for fear of a counter suit.7 '
1. Proof of arrest dispensed with.
There are instances of departure from the arrest or seizure re-
quirement. The case of Weiss v. Huna is typical." Here, the allegations
were that the defendant instituted an action for the purpose of preventing
the plaintiff from delivering certain shares of stock before a contractual
deadline. As a result, the plaintiff suffered a loss of profits which le
alleged as damages. In remanding the case for trial the court stated:
If the plaintiff could prove . . . that such conduct by the de-
fendant had damaged him, he should have established what
constituted the tort of abuse of process under the law of most
American courts including New York."
Apparently, proof of lost profit would be sufficient to state a cause
of action for abuse of process-before the Weiss court. However, this
interpretation of New York law is of doubtful accuracy in view of such
statements by New York courts as, "If the person not be arrested or his
66. A typical case is Allen Co. v. Brandow, 59 Ill. App. 2d 12, 207 N.E.2d 339
(1965), where the court stated:
An action for abuse of process will not lie unless there has been either an injury
to the person or property. There must be an actual siezure of the property
of the plaintiff or an arrest of his person.
207 N.E.2d at 343.
67. Seibrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 185 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ore. 1960).
68. Gorton v. Brown, 27 Il1. 489 (1862); Abbot v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 P.
302 (1904).
69. Seibrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 185 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ore. 1960).
70. Gorton v. Brown, 27 Il. 489 (1862); Abbot v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692,
76 P. 302 (1904).
71. Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Ia. 741, 18 N.W. 870 (1884).
72. 312 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1963).
73. Id. at 716. Instead of retrying the case on remand, the plaintiff abandoned the
claim for abuse of process and sought redress by instituting a wholly independent
action. Weiss v. Beonsel, 344 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1965).
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property seized, no matter how unfounded the action may be, there
is no abuse of process."4
2. Consequential damages.
When the victim of an abuse of process proves that he was arrested
or that his property was seized, he is allowed to recover all damages
caused by the arrest or seizure." He is not limited to damages directly
caused by the arrest or seizure. In Malone v. Belchere' the plaintiff had
agreed to sell certain property to a third party. The defendant caused this
property to be attached, intending to prevent the sale. The appellate
court reversed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff could recover only
damages directly caused by the attachment. The appellate court reached
its conclusion by analogizing the facts before it to an action for malicious
prosecution. The successful plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action
is allowed to recover for injury proximately caused to business, reputation
and feelings.
[L] aw is maliciously used for a purpose for which it is not in-
tended and the party injured should be allowed to recover all
such damages as are the natural and probable consequence of
the action complained of."'
LIMITED SCOPE OF THE REMEDY
A. Special damages.
A large percentage of lawsuits never involve an arrest or a seizure
of property. Accordingly, in requiring proof of an arrest or seizure, the
courts have eliminated a number of situations in which a process
may be abused, from the purview of the tort.
The special damage requirement does not reflect an attempt to limit
the victim's remedy to situations involving the most extreme damages.
Rather, this limitation is justified by an analogy to the tort of malicious
prosecution."8 It is an effort to minimize a honest plaintiff's fear of a
countersuit by a successful defendant."9
74. Lief v. Jacobs, 61 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (1946); Silverman v. U.F.A. E. Div.
Distrib. Inc., 135 Misc. 814, 816, 236 N.Y.S. 18, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
75. E.g., McClenny v. Innveranity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 P. 82 (1909) (plaintiff
allowed to recover damages for publicity of custody and intimidating methods of
arrest) ; Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938) (plaintiff's
nervousness and upset condition taken into account for damage in abuse of process).
See also Ingo v. Kosh, 127 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Giddings v. Freedly, 128 F. 355 (2d
Cir. 1904) ; McGam v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 134 A. 710 (1926).
76. 216 Mass. 210, 103 N.E. 637 (1913).
77. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
78. Seibrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 185 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ore. 1960).
79. Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 18 N.W. 870 (1884).
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Viewed in this perspective, the special damage requirement is an
inappropriate restriction of the victim's remedy. Unlike malicious pro-
secution, abuse of process does not lie for maliciously causing an action
to commence. Instead, abuse of process lies for a wrongful use of a pro-
cess already issued. Thus, the honest suitor is not exposed to an action for
abuse of process merely by his bringing an action-as would be the case
with respect to malicious prosecution. Moreover, this requirement may
coerce the honest plaintiff to forego efficient enforcement of his claim
through an arrest or seizure. Finally, the special damage requirement
leaves the dishonest plaintiff free to pursue his illicit schemes with
impunity-by merely avoiding the use of an arrest or seizure.
B. Specific writ requirement.
A legal proceeding as a whole is subject to use as a threat or a club
to the same extent as is a specific writ. One example of this is the strike
suit-an action by a stockholder of a corporation against the directors
of the corporation, not to recover for the cause stated in the complaint,
but for an ulterior motive.
Abuse of process is the only tort directed toward illicit activities
where the misuse occurs after the litigation commences."0 However,
because of the specific writ requirement, abuse of process does not
provide a remedy where an entire litigation has been misused. Accord-
ingly, any injury caused by a misuse of an entire litigation after the
litigation has commenced, is remediless.
CONCLUSION
The legal process may be used in various illicit ways to inflict
injury upon one of the parties to the action. When this injury is caused
by activities occurring after the litigation begins, the tort of abuse of
process provides the sole remedy for the victim. However, in many
situations, the abuse of process remedy is unavailable. It is suggested
that the restrictions limiting the scope of the tort may be inappropriate
and should be the subject of re-evaluation.
80. Even if a plaintiff has an ulterior and malicious motive in bringing an action
there is not abuse of process if the action is confined to its regular and legitimate
function. Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171
(1957).
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